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Abstract 
 
There has been a substantial interest among 
scholars in digital platforms and their governance. This 
paper proposes a different perspective on the 
phenomenon, by providing observations on non-focal 
firms’ dependencies to external platforms. Using the 
case study results of Finnish firms’ utilization of a 
monopolistic BankID authentication platform, we 
describe the platform ecosystem and its transformation 
on organizational and technology aspects. We show 
how legislation can transform the roles and relations 
between ecosystem participants and lead to the long-
time dominant legacy platform weakening. Our study 
extends existing research on platforms and contributes 
new knowledge about the enforced adoption of the 
platform by heterogeneous organizations. These 
findings have important managerial implications, as 
they inform how non-focal firms can understand the use 
of existing and coming digital platforms. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Ever-evolving digital platforms are ubiquitous. 
Platforms are disruptive to organizations and users 
across all sectors, by transforming the ways to think, 
operate and innovate [1]. A company can generate new 
business value by using shared and external multi-sided 
platforms [2] like restaurants using Facebook for 
reservations management, companies using EBay and 
Amazon marketplaces for in B2B, or LinkedIn as a core 
platform for human resources management. By external 
platform utilization, we imply a phenomenon when the 
platform's core offering is shared and collectively 
utilized by heterogeneous actors to build the services 
that extend not the platform’s functionality, but their 
own capability. 
Extant platform ecosystems research provides little 
guidance on firms and platforms interrelationships, 
from the perspective of those organizations that do not 
own or govern the platform, but profoundly depend on 
it. We call these organizations non-focal actors [3]. In 
our context, non-focal actors are subordinate platform 
ecosystem participants that leverage the power of the 
platform for their business needs to extend their 
capabilities. Non-focal actors are usually not in a 
position of power and control to influence the changes 
in response to dynamic needs of a digital ecosystem [4]. 
Nevertheless, the companies willing to sustain their 
competitive advantage have no choice but to engage in 
relationships with the platform. Despite calls for 
investigating the factors that influence a firm’s strategic 
choices on digital platforms [3], [5] there is a dearth of 
studies on fundamental understanding of strategic 
digital platforms utilization by non-focal firms (both in 
industry and academia). This study attempts to 
contribute to the discourse on digital platforms by 
exploring the cases of dependencies to an industry 
platform and untangling “the platform ecosystem 
thinking” perceptions from industry professionals. We 
demonstrate the example of a proprietary platform 
becoming an industry- and country-wide dominant 
infrastructure for organizations from public and private 
sectors. We then show how legislation changes affect 
the platform ecosystem. Our findings also suggest that 
the participation in the platform ecosystems, as argued 
in existing literature [3], [6], is not always prompted to 
ecosystem health and prosperity motives when the 
platform adoption is enforced and it is the only choice.  
 
2. Background  
 
Regardless their size, companies need to carefully 
choose and identify the directions of their innovation 
paths from the myriad of available service platforms [7]. 
Prior research on digital ecosystems positions platform 
owners, tech giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook 
and Microsoft, at the center of attention. For example, 
Eaton et al. [8]  studied the boundary resources 
evolution of Apple’s iOS ecosystem. Gawer & 
Cusumano  [9] studied the strategies for platform 
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leadership building. Paradigmatic analysis of digital 
application marketplaces and the monopolistic quality 
of platforms was discussed by Ghazawneh & 
Henfridsson [6] and Eisenmann et al. [10]. The results 
obtained by Henfridsson & Bygstad [11] on 
configurational perspectives of digital infrastructures 
evolution demonstrated the generative mechanisms of 
such infrastructures. Adner & Kapoor [12] showed how 
the challenges faced by external innovators affect the 
focal firm’s (platform owner) outcomes. This 
asymmetrical emphasis on focal actors and platform 
ecosystem governance makes the work of Selander et al. 
[3] on non-focal actors’ capability search and redeem to 
stand out from the extant literature. In this idiographic 
research explanation [3] based on historical data limited 
to Sony Ericsson, the authors acknowledge the need for 
empirical evidence that would enrich the 
conceptualization and bring a deeper understanding on 
first-hand accounts of non-focal actor use of platform 
ecosystems. In addition, Huang et al. [13] studied the 
tendencies of software vendors to join an innovation 
ecosystem with a larger empirical focus. Lindgren et al. 
[14] also adopt a non-focal actors perspective and 
question how the identity of non-focal actors may be 
changed by the participation in an ecosystem. We depart 
from this literature by exploring how the organizations 
that purely utilize the platforms to extend their own 
capability recognize such dependencies. 
 
2.1. Non-focal Perspective  
 
A platform owner or sponsor (i.e. focal actor) often 
dominates and exercises control over the innovation 
network of its ecosystem [2]. Eck & Uebernickel [15] 
define platform providers and sponsors as “platform 
orchestrators”. Focal actors regulate the resources and 
knowledge flow within the network and, subsequently, 
orchestrate the types of innovations created in the 
ecosystem [15]. Focal actors also define the boundaries 
of the ecosystem by creating different types of entry-
barriers. Non-focal actors are subordinate ecosystem 
participants that extend their business capabilities by 
building their services, products or technologies using 
the platform resources. Resources can include a 
combination of assets (physical, human or technology), 
knowledge, or capabilities. Non-focal actor’s individual 
participation in platform ecosystem is not critical for the 
ecosystem survival and sustainability, thus non-focal 
actors are positioned at the periphery of the ecosystem 
from the ecosystem’s perspective [3]. However, 
alliances of larger non-focal firms or a majority of small 
firms, so called “the power of the crowd”, sometimes 
with the help or support of regulating bodies (e.g. 
legislation, corporate lobbying) can influence 
platforms’ development [8].  
In this paper, we show how such changes can take 
place in platform ecosystems in the context of Finnish 
Identity Management (IDM) standard abatement. 
External platforms or industry platforms are “products, 
services, or technologies developed by one or more 
firms, and which serve as foundations upon which a 
larger number of firms can build further complementary 
innovations and potentially generate network effects” 
[16]. These “larger number of firms” or platform-
utilizing businesses are in the primary focus of this 
research.  
The platform orchestrators decide on whether they 
can open the platform to their competitors within the 
same industry or to other firms in other industries with 
complementary assets, such as existing user bases, 
technologies, or distribution channels. Lyytinen et al. 
[17] identify three strategic behaviors in this regard: 
competition (one firm provides a platform and competes 
against the other platforms in the ecosystem); co-
opetition (competing firms within the same industry 
decide to collaborate and provide a single intra-industry 
platform within the ecosystem); and collaboration 
(multiple firms from different industries collaborate to 
provide an inter-industry platform). These mechanisms, 
especially coopetition, have been mostly studied from 
platform and complementor (Independent Software 
Vendors, ISVs) perspective, leaving the perspective of 
platform-utilizing firms relationships ill-defined.We 
aim to contribute to the digital platforms research by 
filling this void.  
 
2.2. Platforms, Ecosystems and Infrastructures 
 
We adopt the definition of digital platform as “the 
set of components used in common across a product 
family whose functionality can be extended by third 
parties” [18], [19]. However, this definition is somewhat 
framed towards software platforms and independent 
software vendors (ISVs) that develop complementary 
products to extend the platform core functionality (e.g. 
SAP add-ons). Gawer & Cusumano [16] distinguish 
platforms between internal and external platforms. They 
define internal (company or product) platforms as a set 
of assets organized in a common structure from which a 
company can efficiently develop and produce a stream 
of derivative products [16]. Whereas, external 
(industry) platforms are sets of assets organized in a 
common structure that act as a foundation upon which 
external innovators can develop their own 
complementary products, technologies, or services.  
It is important to highlight the inseparability of 
social and technical constructs when investigating the 
digital artefacts in an organizational context. The same 
applies to platforms and infrastructures; they are socio-
technical entities comprising social (governance rules 
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and social actors) and technical aspects (systems and 
architecture). We agree with Hanseth & Lyytinen  [20] 
that the differences between platforms and 
infrastructures are in their overall increasing  
complexity, how they relate to their design and use 
environments, and how they behave over time in 
relation to those environments. Platforms are integral 
parts of digital infrastructures and there is a recursive 
relation between them. The core utility of a platform is 
that it allows building a valuable service to its users. A 
platform that is used to extend firm’s capabilities 
becomes that firms’ infrastructure, i.e. the internal 
platform can evolve into external platform, when it is an 
integral part of its user organizations. In this paper, we 
do not seek to reargue the definitions. Rather, we adapt 
the interpretation on digital infrastructures from [11] as 
“the heterogeneous collection of sociotechnical 
components that are essential or contribute to the 
functioning of a system, organization or industry.” The 
definition could be also adjusted to different contexts: 
enterprise, industry, economy, national, regional, and 
global levels [21]. 
Scholars mostly agree on the notion of platform 
ecosystem defined as “collectives of organizations that 
are interlinked by a reciprocal interest in the prosperity 
of a digital platform for materializing their own product 
or service” [3]. Organizational economics literature 
refers to platform ecosystems as “two-sided markets”, 
“multi-sided markets”, or “multi-sided platforms” [2]. 
Armstrong [22] defines two-sided markets as “markets 
involving two groups of agents interacting via 
‘platforms’ where one group's benefit from joining a 
platform depends on the size of the other group that 
joins the platform”. Consequently, a phenomenon 
whereby a product or service gains additional value as 
more users use it, is called the network effect [23].  
The body of knowledge on inter-organizational 
networks [23]–[25], business and platform ecosystems 
suggests that the focus on a pair or a network of firms 
helps to explain different outcomes of firms’ in a given 
industry. We follow the relational view theoretical 
traditions [25] that stresses the idiosyncratic inter-firm 
linkages. This perspective helps us to focus on non-focal 
actors’ roles in platform ecosystem by interpreting their 
relations and views towards the platform and its 
orchestrators. 
 
2.3. Research Problem and Questions 
  
A growing stream of research have investigated the 
value co-creation mechanisms of non-focal ISVs. 
Platform ecosystems are emerging ubiquitously, across 
industries and domains, not being limited to software 
add-on development scenarios. As digitalization 
progresses, it affects the processes of products and 
services creation, and strengthening the role of software 
overall. The number of non-focal platform-utilizing 
firms usually outnumber the platforms - this is the 
characteristic of multi-sided markets [2]. The lack of 
theoretical and analytical models tackling 
organizations’ dependencies to various platforms and 
infrastructures indicates insufficient understanding of 
such phenomenon, consequently making it an important 
research direction.   
To address the research gaps, we formed the 
following research questions to study:  
“How do the changes in the platform ecosystem 
affects non-focal firms? How can the non-focal actor 
relations towards the dominating platform be 
characterized? ” To answer these two questions, we 
engage in case studies of seven Finnish organizations 
that utilize BankID electronic identity management 
(eIDM) platform. We inspect the dependency relations 
to the monopolistic BankID platform and investigate the 
roles that our case-firms have in that ecosystem.  
 
3. Research Process 
 
This research followed the exploratory case study 
design [26]. The holistic case study design is the most 
appropriate strategy when a single unit of analysis is 
studied within multiple cases [27]. The case study 
revolved around our perspective on the phenomenon: 
we took the interviewees’ views towards the platform 
dependency as a unit of analysis within each case-
company individually. The study design and context are 
presented in the following sections. 
 
3.1. Research Site: Platform Dominance  
  
The Finnish electronic Identity Management (eIDM) 
is based on three methods: national eID cards (FINEID), 
financial associations’ BankID (commonly known as 
TUPAS), and MobileIDs endorsed by telecom 
operators. However, the TUPAS authentication method 
accounts for more than 90% of all online transactions 
[28]. In 1999, the state introduced non-mandatory 
FINEID cards to replace the older citizen ID card with a 
machine-readable smartcard chip, but citizens did not 
take the technology into use. In retrospect, experts 
account FINEID failure due to high costs of required 
card-readers, learning effort to the installation and 
certificate usage, user experience (UX) issues and 
historically well-disseminated TUPAS BankID [29]. 
TUPAS identification is a de facto standard from the late 
1980s owned and administered by banks association in 
Finland. It is based on a combination of PIN and the 
paper access codes scheme (the list of One Time 
Passwords, OTP). Bank-specific identifiers have a high 
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penetration in Finnish market and can be used across a 
broad range of services and segments, not just banking, 
including e-commerce and governmental e-services. 
MobileIDs is a PKI-based (Public Key Infrastructure) 
authentication method released by Finnish mobile 
operators. It requires a specialized SIM card with a 
certificate in it and a contract with the mobile operator. 
MobileIDs can be used to access all public e-services, 
and many private services. 
An important development in the Finnish eIDM case 
is the EU eIDAS regulation N°910/2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market [30]. Not going into 
details of the legislation vision, we only sketch how it 
affects the Finnish eIDM. Starting from mid-2017, 
Finnish banks need to lower the prices per transaction in 
the private market and allow distributors (Service 
Brokers) to solve the contracts and technical integration 
complexities. Firms interested in becoming Service 
Brokers need to meet the requirements for strong 
electronic identification laid down in the legislation. 
Practically, the list of registered providers includes 
banks, telecom operators, and incumbent service 
brokers. 
 
3.2. Case Settings 
 
Our cases include seven Finnish organizations and 
firms that utilize TUPAS eIDM platform in their e-
services. Initially, the study involved the participation of 
three organizations: Telco, PSP and the Agency only. 
We did not begin this study with the intention of 
studying eIDM platform only. We started with a general 
inquiry on external integrations and consequently 
discovered the magnitude and dependence degree on 
TUPAS standard throughout the country. We further 
contacted ISV1, ISV2, City and PRC to get more insights 
on TUPAS utilizations.  
Telco is a telecommunications operator and a major 
cable operator, a pay TV provider in both cable and 
terrestrial networks. The company employs around 
1600 people and serves around 2.7 million customers.  
PSP is a large payment service provider. The 
customers of PSP are banks, businesses, merchants and 
the public sector. PSP employs approximately 2,400 
employees in six countries and according to recent stats 
(2016), it served a network of more than 300,000 
merchants and 240 banks. PSP’s services also include 
the payment and authentication bundle services. 
Agency is part of the Finnish government. The 
Agency prepares the government's economic and 
financial policy as well as the budget, and acts as a tax 
policy expert. One of the tasks of the Agency is the 
general steering of public sector agencies’ information 
management.  
PRC is a governmental organization that operates 
under the authority of the Agency. PRC’s task is to 
develop, support and manage the usage of electronic 
data contained in governmental and public Information 
Systems.  
City is a municipality that represent the local level of 
administration. The City council is the main decision-
making organ in local politics, dealing with issues such 
as city planning, schools, health care, and public 
transport. The City operates the portal for e-services 
where citizens can make appointments and manage 
documents electronically. 
ISV1 is the small payment service operator that 
resolves bureaucratic complexities of salary payments 
as an Internet service. Their cloud-based service 
provides a suite of open APIs and support services for 
any company or individual to integrate payroll features 
and salary payments, including integrations between 
insurance companies, tax agencies, pension companies, 
employment foundations and banks. 
ISV2 is a software-development company founded 
in 2015. Their main service is a native mobile app for 
students that integrates study records, campus restaurant 
menus, indoor positioning guide maps, various news 
and feeds – all essential information students need in 
their daily university life.  
 
3.3. Data Collection and Analysis 
  
We used both primary (i.e. interviews) and secondary 
(e.g. reports) data sources for this study. We began by 
performing a detailed background check of the 
companies, such as progress reports, internet searches, 
related case studies and literature review of similar 
companies. Companies involved in the study agreed 
upon commitment to research interaction and 
experimentations prior to research commencement. 
We conducted interviews with 24 industry experts, 
most of whom have been associated with the industry 
for more than 15 years. The interviews were semi-
structured [26] and lasted at least for one hour.  
Each interview began by asking the interviewee’s 
position, background, experience and 
projects/products/services he or she is managing. Next, 
the following discussion covered two topics: existing 
utilizations of external platforms, planned/expected 
integrations and experiences with TUPAS platform. 
Interviews followed the funnel model [27] principle - 
from open to more specific questions. We recorded and 
transcribed each interview and coded the data as in 
Grounded Theory [31]. We analyzed the gathered data 
with a qualitative data coding and analysis tool, Atlas.ti. 
We extracted quotes from transcribed interviews that we 
believed were relevant regarding the research questions. 
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Table 1. Case companies and interviews 
 Industry 
and size 
(number of 
employees) 
№ of  
intervie
ws 
Interviewees positions 
Telco Telecommu
nication 
operator. 
1700 
9 Main architect, 
Development manager, 
Head of online 
performance, Corporate 
solutions director, CDO 
PSP Payment 
service 
provider, 
2500 
4 Services development, 
SVP of digital 
innovations, Digital 
practices manager 
Agency Ministry, 
360 
4 Development manager, 
Main architect, 
Ministerial advisor 
PRC Governmen
t’s digital 
services, 
130 
1 E-gov development 
project manager 
City Municipalit
y, 40 000 
2 Architect, Head of e-
services program 
ISV1 Software 
developme
nt, 20 
2 CEO and CTO 
(interviewed together) 
ISV2 Software 
developme
nt, 10 
1 CEO 
For example, we coded “every software would like to 
call itself a software platform” with the code 
“understanding about platforms”. The quote “when it 
comes to let’s say web shop payments identifications we 
use TUPAS from other external partners” with the code 
“service broker bundling”; and the quote “because it 
makes no sense to build it yourself, it is available, 
relatively cheap and ready” with the code “reasons for 
integration”. We organized these codes into categories 
(e.g. generic or case-specific) to each firm 
correspondingly and sorted them by social or technical 
integration aspect we identified. After this, we created 
the findings mapping between firms to find relationships 
and associations among them. We coded and analyzed 
the data without any priori hypotheses. Our goal was to 
let the understanding of the phenomenon emerge from 
the data and interviews [32]. We analyzed the 
perceptions in industrial organizations about external 
platforms, their recognition, realization of existing and 
future platform dependencies, associating challenges 
and issues. 
 
4. TUPAS: Socio-Technical Perspective 
 
In this section, we present the findings of our case 
studies. Intertwined social and technical aspects of 
relationships in platform ecosystems are often complex 
to analyze. Thereby, we first present the technical view 
on integrations (software protocols) in section 4.1, 
followed by the organizational perspective on roles in 
platform ecosystem in section 4.2. With the aim of 
answering the research questions our results cover both 
technology-centric and social aspects of the platform 
ecosystem transformation. We cross-compare these in 
the light of eIDAS: how authentication services in 
Finland operated (before) and how the regulation is 
changing the ecosystem (after).  
 
4.1. How Actors Integrate to the Platform 
Ecosystem? 
 
We describe TUPAS platform from the software and 
interactions perspective first. TUPAS protocol has been 
jointly specified by the Finnish Federation of Finnish 
Financial services (FFI, i.e. all Finnish banks) more than 
20 years ago (the latest protocol specification dates from 
2013).  
Before the eIDAS regulation change: The Service 
Provider (a firm willing to authenticate its customers) 
initiates the identification by sending an identification 
request to the customer (Fig. 1, arrows 1 and 2). The 
customer then transfers the request to their own bank’s 
identification service by clicking on the bank’s icon 
(Fig. 1, arrow 3). The request validity is verified by the 
bank and the customer is asked to authenticate (Fig. 1, 
arrow 4). At this stage, the customer needs to use the 
paper-based OTP password. Only one of the banks has 
a token-generator mobile-app. Bank’s TUPAS service 
sends a response message to the customer once the 
identification has taken place (Fig. 1, arrow 5). The 
customer checks the information on the certificate (Fig. 
1, arrow 6), and after approving it, returns to the Service 
Provider's service (Fig. 1, arrow 7) at which point the 
certificate's data is transmitted to the service provider 
(Fig. 1, arrow 8). 
In short, in order to query the user identity by 
accessing the banks customers’ database, the method 
comprises a few SOAP over HTTPS calls. From our 
case-companies, we learned that the technical 
integration is not as difficult as the contracts 
management: 
“… technical part of the integration like the API calls 
look mostly the same from bank to bank. So from a 
technical point of view it was quite easy, but the paper 
work was huge – ISV2, CEO. 
“It is very old and straightforward” – ISV1, CTO. 
Examining the relations of case-companies to the 
platform from the technology point of view, we observe 
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that firms understand the simplicity of integration 
process, yet, obsolescence of the standard itself.  
“… the protocol sense – really technical sense. There 
are some problems with the technology, for instance it 
has been demonstrated that you can find SSN numbers 
in the cache of the browser”- Telco, Development 
manager. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Before: BankID authentication workflow 
After the eIDAS regulation change: To comply 
with eIDAS regulation, eliminate security issues and 
enable single sign-on, the Finnish state decided to move 
from TUPAS to SAML and OpenID Connect protocol 
suites. The Figure 2 below highlights the changes, 
replacing “TUPAS” with “SAML or OpenID Connect” 
certificates, and wrapping “Banks” with the “Service 
Broker”. 
 
 
Figure 1. After: BankID authentication workflow 
Agency, as a member of the regulatory body, 
commented on these: 
“Google is using that [SAML, OpenID Connect 
protocols], Facebook is using, everyone, those big 
players are using, and also the PRC using for long time 
already, they have these mandatory protocols that at 
least you have to support [specified in the regulation], 
and the SAML is mandatory and mobile, OpenID 
Connect is mandatory as well” – Agency, Development 
manager. 
According to one informant, there are signs that that 
the TUPAS standard will not be upgraded/updated 
according to the new requirements. From the protocol 
viewpoint, that means that TUPAS platform might still 
be used internally among banks, however, they cannot 
offer TUPAS standard to service providers – it will be 
prevented by the legislation.  
“What could happen is that if there are banks that don’t 
want to invest or develop [TUPAS], they could of course 
protect these links here with VPNs, to make them private 
– because it is only P2P [banks - service Brokers] 
connection which is done only once – you could use path 
here for indefinite here, with some crypto tunnel. But 
you can’t use it in the public internet side.”- Telco, 
Development manager. 
Though the financial organizations are genuinely 
secretive in their plans, the question is still open if the 
banks are going to continue cross-collaboration or 
develop solutions individually. 
 
4.2. Roles and Relations in Platform Ecosystem 
 
All our case organizations have enthusiastically 
acknowledged the eIDAS legislation change. In this 
section, we describe the social network view of 
ecosystem participants. The view of organizations, their 
roles and relations in the context of TUPAS ecosystem 
clarifies the individual organizations’ roles and shows 
how their relations differentiate and how they are 
transformed by the eIDAS regulation.  
Before the eIDAS regulation change: Until now, 
service providers had to sign separate contracts with 
each bank. Some third-party firms (SB in Figures below) 
provide both banks and service providers with bundle-
services for identity assurance, authentication and 
signatures and facilitate the technical deployment 
(certificates acquiring, APIs). PRC is responsible for 
public sector’s authentication services provision. 
Banks kept the right to set the per-transaction 
charges in the private sector; the state had negotiated 
special pricing for public organizations. Banks could 
also refuse the authentication services provision to firms 
when “it is evident that the TUPAS certificate would be 
used for unethical or illegal activities, or if the use of the 
certificate could potentially cause financial or 
immaterial losses to the bank” [33]. 
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Figure 2. Before: Actors’ social network 
After the eIDAS regulation change: The 
introduction and legitimization of the man-in-the-
middle distributor role solves the complexities of 
individual contracts that service provider needs to make 
with each bank.  
“The biggest relief for us is that we don’t have to make 
contracts individually” – City, e-services manager. 
“There’s something good in EU” – ISV1, CEO. 
Starting from mid-2017, there is a price ceiling for 
each authentication transaction, a government-imposed 
price control that weakens the banks’ valorization.  The 
Figure below demonstrates the roles rearrangement 
service brokers’1 responsibilities. Currently, the list of 
registered brokers includes all Finnish banks, telecom 
operators, PRC and others (e.g. SB). 
 
 
Figure 3. After: Actors’ social network 
Obviously, existing broker firms in the private 
market are going to face more severe competition. 
Telecom operators are also going to enter service broker 
                                                 
1 Service brokers can be service providers simultaneously, but not all 
service providers can be brokers. There is a complex procedure in 
place in order to attain  brokering license  
market; Telco has expressed the enthusiasm about the 
change, as “it is going to open up the market.” 
Interestingly, Telco has a service broker firm (SB) that 
manages the technical integrations, and after the eIDAS 
change takes place – from having partnership relations 
they are going to be direct competitors.  
 
5. Discussion 
  
We compile the findings and investigate them 
through the spectrum of existing theories in the 
following themes. The first two themes belong to the 
platform and its focal role in the ecosystem, which has 
a great influence on the ecosystem development.  The 
next three themes cover non-focal firms’ resisting and 
accommodating attitude towards the dominating 
platform; roles and relations reconfiguration along with 
power redistribution among ecosystem participants, 
which were caused by the legislation change. 
Internal to external platform evolution. Gawer and 
Cusumano’s [16] distinctions between internal and 
external platform (from the platform owners’ 
perspective) do not fit the case of TUPAS platform as it 
is an internal and external at the same time. Banks first 
established TUPAS platform for their internal use, and 
consequently they opened it to other heterogeneous 
actors. Scholars [16] suggest that the evolution from 
internal platforms to external platforms hypotheses 
would need to be developed and tested. Although it was 
not the main focus of this article, our case settings 
descriptively provide the context of the platform, which 
was used first by the banks only, i.e. was internal, 
evolved and became other firms’ infrastructure, i.e. 
external. In this paper, we wish to draw attention to the 
emergence conditions of such platforms evolution and 
their enforced adoption by heterogeneous organizations.  
From dominance to deterioration. The success and 
sustained dominance of TUPAS platform was 
contingent to the resource they possess (i.e. customer 
base), which is valuable and hard to imitate [34]. In such 
highly-regulated markets, changes can occur due to 
legislation, politics, corporate lobbying and technology 
disruption. By investigating TUPAS we fortuitously 
address the calls for public-private sector partnerships 
research [14] by reviewing how the governmental 
endorsement contributes to the authentication 
platform’s  sustained dominance and how the regulation 
changes in the ecosystem can recursively lead to the 
platform deterioration. Ecosystem changes from the 
software perspective could occur via boundary 
resources, e.g. data access protocol. The current 
Page 1499
  
platform literature offers powerful lenses for 
conceptualizing the role of boundary resources2 as a 
mechanism to secure platform owner’s power and solve 
the paradox of control and generativity stimulation. 
[35], [36]. TUPAS eIDM case demonstrates how the 
platform itself is being counter-influenced through the 
boundary resources, i.e. the communication protocols 
defined by the platform owners are modified by more 
powerful entities. In this case the EU became the 
regulatory body. 
The fact that banks have been using OTPs printed on 
paper for nearly 20 years is an ideal case of an 
incumbent inertia effect. Incumbent inertia happens 
when the market leader does not adjust to the new 
challenges of the market, or do not wish to change their 
strategy or products. Platform orchestrators must 
manage the delicate balance of generativity and control 
in the platform [37]. Banks in Finland exercised too 
much control over the TUPAS platform, with the risk of 
driving out third-party developers, thus possibly 
preventing the generativity of the platform. 
Resistance and accommodation. Our case-
organizations understand that the TUPAS “as 
technology” is obsolete; nevertheless, they are enforced 
to use it. We observe slight contrasting attitudes towards 
the platform as “banks” and platform as “protocol”. 
PSP, given the close relationships with the banks and 
financial institutions, is in cooperating relationships 
with the BankID method. We observe that Telco, due to 
its attempts to promote the MobileID method, has more 
competitive attitude to the platform and a forced 
acceptance of the standard itself. Agency, PRC and City, 
being public sector organizations, cannot interfere in 
private market’s development, thus, also need to take 
BankID methods in use. Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
[38] define “co-opete” as “competing without having to 
kill the opposition and cooperating without having to 
ignore self-interest.” Coopetititive attitude towards the 
platform is observed among the firms that own a 
competitive authentication method (FINEID, 
MobileID). We could also observe the acquiescence, i.e. 
reluctant acceptance of the platform dominance among 
smaller organizations. ISV1 and ISV2 are small firms 
that do not have any special relationships with the 
platform and cannot influence conditions in any way.  
Non-focal actors’ views we present are complex, and 
to some degree with negative perception of platform 
owners’ dominance and the forced utilization of the 
platform. Thus, the concept of actors’ interest in 
ecosystem’s health and prosperity  [3] may not always 
                                                 
2 Boundary resources refer to “the software tools and regulations that 
serve as the interface for the arm’s length relationship between the 
platform owner and the application developer” [36]. 
be true. Such relations towards the dominating platform 
can occur when the platform becomes “the only choice”. 
Power distribution. Regulation changes can disrupt 
the roles of actors and disseminate the cumulative power 
in platform ecosystems. Recent literature has 
investigated the challenges of organizational identity 
transformations when establishing novel relationships 
with other ecosystem participants [14]. In this paper, we 
show that identity boundaries may be ambiguous and 
imprecise as the real dependencies could be masked 
with the complex service provider & orchestrator 
relations. In TUPAS case, banks still own the platform, 
but are forced to open the access to it to service brokers. 
That is to say that the cumulative power in the 
ecosystem is the same, but due to eIDAS regulation is 
more distributed among actors. Banks’ position is 
weakened while service brokers gain more control.  
Roles and relations reconfiguration. From social 
and organizational perspectives, regulation changes can 
affect the roles of ecosystem participants. Relations 
between firms are not always linear; firms can be 
partners in one market and be competitors in another. 
Lyytinen et al. in [17] point out that the participation in 
platform ecosystems pushes “innovators to increasingly 
connect and reconnect to actors across a myriad of 
organizations and communities; this will lead to a 
continuing expansion and reconfiguration of innovation 
networks, making them more like anarchic networks” 
(italics is ours). In this paper, we support this theoretical 
implication with example cases. The lesson learned 
from this last theme is that the firms should learn how 
to switch cautiously from e.g. partnership-based 
relations to direct competitors or vice versa. 
 
6. Limitations and Future research 
 
One of the key concepts of digitalization could be 
when the data - once entered is always retrievable. Most 
organizations, if not all, will need to open up and expose 
their interfaces and data flows, so it may trigger 
innovation and lead to an authentic digital society [21]. 
The same applies to the case we presented; identity 
management is an important step towards the successful 
digital services advancement in a society. In this paper, 
we presented how seven Finnish organizations have 
different perceptions on industry platform dependence. 
This study has limitations. The empirical evidence we 
provide may be industry or country specific. Qualitative 
research findings illustrate the specific phenomena 
studied in real-life settings and are not generalizable to 
the population as such. However, case studies not only 
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bring richer semantical meanings for the problem 
understanding, but also can act as an effective 
benchmarking method to evaluate the theory, to which 
then the solutions could be developed and transferred 
into industrial practice. While understanding the 
inseparability of political context in studying 
contemporary industry platforms we call for more 
research to bridge the gap on non-focal actors’ 
endeavors in ubiquitously emerging platform 
ecosystems. In this article, we managed to only scratch 
the surface of platform evolution, especially when the 
platform is internal and external simultaneously. 
Another important perspective is to theorize the 
transition of the platform to an infrastructure. These 
research directions promise to deliver novel insights and 
contribute to our understanding of platform ecosystem 
dynamics.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The present study contributes to the platform 
ecosystems studies by providing an empirical 
investigation of non-focal actors’ insights on platform 
dependence. We show how legislation changes can 
affect the roles, relations and power controls of 
incumbent ecosystem participants. The Finnish 
monopolistic eIDM ecosystem provides a unique 
context to describe the platform’s wide adoption, 
expansion, which then seem to weaken its position. 
Whereas from the non-focal perspective, firms across 
sectors exhibit a resisting and accommodating attitude 
towards the dominating platform. The findings also 
emphasize the role of software as a mechanism to 
disrupt the power distribution within the ecosystem. 
Extensive integrations to various platforms and 
participation in such ecosystems may lead to new roles, 
patterns for collaboration or competition and value 
proposition mechanisms. Yet non-focal firms need to 
understand the “rules” to benefit the most and minimize 
the risks of such platform-dependencies.  
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